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1. Introduction
Population ageing has a serious impact on future public spending and is
considered an important challenge for fiscal policy. The recent demogra-
phic developments and trends have predetermined the age profile of the po-
pulation for the upcoming decades. Low fertility rates and a rising life ex-
pectancy rate will significantly increase the number of elderly people. As
a result, the old-age dependency ratio will rise rapidly. The Czech Repub-
lic belongs to the group of countries faced with the most pronounced age-
ing of the population (OECD, 2002), and its fiscal position will be strongly
affected by increasing age-related spending.
Long-term projections have become an important instrument indicating
the order of magnitude of future fiscal imbalances associated with public
pension schemes. However, expenditure projections focusing on the impact
of ageing populations have often been limited to pension spending and have
not taken into account other budgetary items. The changing age structure
will have an impact on many other spending categories, mainly health care
and education expenditure and child/family benefits. Thus, the projection
of pension spending, taken by itself, is likely to provide an incomplete view
of the overall impact of ageing on public expenditure.
Although the long-term projections are subject to wide margins of uncer-
tainty, they indicate the degree of future fiscal pressures stemming from
population ageing and form a basis for the assessment of the long-term sus-
tainability of public finances. The European Commission requires member
countries to include a specific section on the budgetary impact of popula-
tion ageing in their stability and convergence programmes. Long-term bud-
getary projections make it possible to assess whether the current budge-
tary position and medium-term targets are sufficiently ambitious to avoid
the risk of large future budgetary imbalances.
The aim of this paper is to present long-term projections of the fiscal im-
pact of population ageing on the main age-related spending items, bud-
getary balances and public debt in theCzech Republic. Theprojection exer-
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*** Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, Prague (ales.krejdl@mfcr.cz)cise consists of three interrelated components – (i) demographic projec-
tion, (ii) labour market and macroeconomic projection and (iii) fiscal pro-
jection. Common macroeconomic assumptions as proposed by the OECD
(2001) will be used to project labour market development and the macro-
economic aggregates of interest. A large part of this paper is an updated
and extended version of work carried out at the Czech Ministry of Finance
on this issue.1
The approach applied in the projection exercise can be considered a stan-
dard methodology for long-term projections focused on the impact of popu-
lation ageing on public finances. The same approach has been adopted in
many papers, especially those published by theOECD (2001) and EC (2001).
However, the “current policy” (or baseline) scenario presented in this paper
is not the most likely scenario. The baseline scenario shows the increase in
public spending, deficit and debt under the assumption of unchanged poli-
cies2 and the absence of feedback mechanisms from public finances to
the rest of the economy and it neglects the likely reaction of the financial
markets. The increase in age-related spending will result in a significant
deterioration of the fiscal deficit and public debt. The government is likely
to respond to such fiscal imbalances by cutting spending, increasing taxes
and/or reforming the pension and health care systems. These measures will
have an impact on the labour market and the growth path of the economy.
If the government does not react fast enough, it will face financial difficul-
ties, as the financial markets will punish it for unsustainable public finan-
ces. In any case, the government will not avoid undertaking fiscal consoli-
dation. The more profound is the projected impact of population ageing on
the public deficit and debt, the lower is the probability that the baseline
scenario will actually materialise. As such, the baseline scenario is highly
unrealistic. Nevertheless, its importance rests on the fact that it provides
a measure of future spending pressures and sends a clear message to po-
licy-makers.
Another model has been included in subsection 4.3 of this paper on pen-
sion system analysis. This projection technique has its origins in (Bezdûk,
2000) and was updated and further improved for the purposes of this pa-
per. The model represents a slightly different projection style. It relies on
more simplified assumptions and does not work with the same compre-
hensive, subtle apparatus. However, as many data inputs as possible were
unified for the two models, and thus we can compare the main results of
both projection methods in the area of the Czech public pension scheme.
Such a comparison can also serve as an indirect consistency check of
the main model outcomes.
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1 The Ministry of Finance participated in the OECD project “Fiscal Implications of Ageing” in
2000, and in the project “Projections of Health Care to 2050” in 2002. The current paper draws
on the calculations submitted as part of both projects. The authors cooperated intensively with
other staff members of the Department of Financial Policies and used many of their results.
The paper would not have been written without the previous work of F. Cvengro‰, L. Havlíãek
and K. Dybczak. The authors are grateful for their valuable input and helpful comments.
2 The assumption of unchanged policies was relaxed on a few occasions (e.g. labour productivity
catch-up, reflecting convergence to EU countries, and rise in share of students involved in ter-
tiary education, capturing the trend observed in the last 25 years in EU countries).As was already mentioned, the main aim of this paper is to analyse the li-
kely impact of the process of population ageing on public budgets in
the Czech Republic and in that way provide a pioneering study (to the best
of the authors’ knowledge) and complex input into the mounting debate on
the long-term sustainability of Czech fiscal policy. In this paper, we do not
attempt to deliver any fiscal reform suggestions (i.e. pension system, 
health care spending, etc.), which are, of course, unavoidable in the future.
Although some proposals have already been formulated (inter alia by 
Kreidl (1997), Schneider (1998a, 1998b) and Bezdûk (2000)), this area re-
mains open for further detailed research.
2. Demographic Projections
The demographic projection corresponds to the middle variant of the po-
pulation projection produced by the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO) in Ja-
nuary 2000. The CZSO had projected demographic development until 2030.
The CZSO’s projection was extended up to 2050, assuming the same para-
meter values as for 2030. In 2000, the United Nations published its own
demographic projections for all countries, including the Czech Republic. As
compared to the CZSO’s middle variant, the Czech population will be age-
ing even more rapidly, and the Czech Republic will have one of the oldest
populations in the world. The more pessimistic outlook results from the dif-
ferent assumptions applied by the UN. The UN projection is an extrapola-
tion of the current situation and assumes that the current extremely low
fertility rate will be maintained in the future. The CZSO projection, taking
into account likely changes in the main demographic parameters, was pre-
ferred in the exercise.
The population profile over time depends on assumptions about fertility,
mortality and net immigration flows. In 2000, the Czech Republic reported
a fertility rate of 1.14, the lowest among the OECD countries (OECD ave-
rage: 1.46). Although fertility is assumed to increase from 1.14 to 1.50 by
2030 and to remain at a higher level thereafter, it will probably not reach
the OECD average (1.60 in 2030 and 1.61 in 2050). A fertility rate lower
than 2.0 implies a long-run decline in the total population. Life expectancy
at birth, reflecting mortality over the whole lifespan of a particular cohort,
is expected to increase for both males and females, but the increases are
smaller for women than for men. Life expectancy for males is assumed to
rise from 71.5 to 75.2 years and for females from 78.4 to 81.5 years. Net im-
migration is difficult to predict, since it depends on the economic situation
of the country, the situation on the labour market and immigration policy.
The projection is based on the assumption of an increasing active migra-
tion balance. From 2030 on, net immigration will add roughly 15,000 per-
sons to the Czech population. The assumptions and results of the demo-
graphic projection are summarised in Table 1 and Figure 1.
The projection results in agradual decline in thepopulation from 10.3mil-
lion in 2000 to 9.7 million in 2030 and 8.4 million in 2050. In the medium
and long term, the Czech Republic will face the effects of an ageing popu-
lation. The age profile of the population is deteriorating and generating se-
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spectives. By the end of the projection period, the share of the elderly (de-
fined as those over 60) in the total population will more than double from
18 % in 2000 to 38 %. The share of the working-age population (20–59) will
drop from 59 % to 45 %, and the share of the young population (0–19) will
shrink from 23 % to 17 %. The average age of the population will be almost
10 years higher (38 vis-à-vis 47). The old-age dependency ratio – defined as
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2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Assumptions
Total fertility rate  1.14 1.32 1.44 1.50 1.50 1.50
Life expectancy of men (years) 71.5 73.7 74.5 75.2 75.2 75.2
Life expectancy of women (years) 78.4 80.5 81.0 81.5 81.5 81.5
Active migration balance (thousands) 9.5 11.3 13.2 15.0 15.0 15.0
Results
Population (thousands) 10 268 10 244 10 098 9 691 9 047 8 367
Average age of population (years) 38.2 40.9 43.4 45.7 46.7 47.3
Old-age dependency ratio 31.4 40.9 51.4 58.6 74.8 83.0
Age structure (%)
Men
0–19 24.1 20.3 19.3 18.2 17.4 17.7
20–54 54.5 52.0 49.4 45.6 42.1 40.3
55–64 10.5 14.4 12.6 15.1 16.2 14.4
65+ 10.9 13.3 18.7 21.2 24.4 27.6
Women
0–19 21.7 18.3 17.4 16.4 15.7 16.0
20–54 50.6 47.9 45.7 42.0 38.8 37.0
55–64 11.1 14.9 12.5 14.8 16.0 14.0
65+ 16.6 18.9 24.4 26.9 29.5 33.0
TABLE 1 Assumptions and Results
Source: Czech Statistical Office; Ministry of Finance; author’s calculationsthe elderly population of 60 years and over to the working-age population
– will rise steeply from 31.4 to 83.0.
Demographic projections covering time horizons over several decades are
generally very uncertain, as they are conditional on the assumptions ap-
plied with respect to the fertility rate, life expectancy and migration flows.
These uncertainties may be even higher in the context of the Czech Re-
public. The extremely low fertility rate reported in the Czech Republic is
a result of the transformation period, but it is difficult to judge how fast
and to what level it will eventually rise. Moreover, the free movement of
workers following EU accession will affect migration flows, but the magni-
tude of those migration flows is subject to considerable uncertainties. Lea-
ving these uncertainties aside, an international comparison (Table 2) indi-
cates that the Czech Republic ranks as a rapidly ageing country, as
measured by the old-age dependency ratio (behind Italy, Spain, Austria and
Poland). The increasing number of elderly people and the shrinking wor-
king-age population will have a major impact on the labour market and so-
cial and health care systems.
3. The Labour Market and Macroeconomic Projections
Labour market trends and macroeconomic indicators will be affected by
the changing age profile of the population. In order to project the main la-
bour market and macroeconomic variables, apopulation projection was com-
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Selected OECD countries 2000 2050 Change in p. points
Austria 25.2 58.2 33.0
Belgium 28.1 49.5 21.4
Czech Republic 21.9 57.5 35.6
Finland 25.9 50.6 24.7
France 27.2 50.8 23.6
Germany 26.6 53.2 26.6
Hungary 23.7 47.2 23.5
Italy 28.8 66.8 38.0
Netherlands 21.9 44.9 23.0
Norway 25.6 41.2 15.6
Poland 20.4 55.2 34.8
Portugal 26.7 50.9 24.2
Spain 27.1 65.7 38.6
Sweden 29.4 46.3 16.9
United Kingdom 26.6 45.3 18.7
OECD average 23.8 49.9 26.1
TABLE 2 International Comparison of Population Ageing – Old-age Dependency Ratio
Note: The old-age dependency ratio is here defined as the number of persons aged 65 and over divided by
the number of persons aged 20–64. Such a definition is common in international studies on ageing.
The definition used in Table 1 drew the line between the working age population and the old-age po-
pulation at the age of 60, which is closer to the effective retirement age in the Czech Republic.
Source: (OECD, 2001)bined with macroeconomic assumptions on participation rates, the unem-
ployment rate and labour productivity. The common assumptions proposed
by theOECD (2001) were applied in all cases (participation rates, theunem-
ployment rate) unless the transition nature of the Czech economy made
the common assumptions unrealistic (labour productivity). Attention was
paid to real variables only, because price development is hard to project and
over longer time periods revenues and expenditures are influenced by price
increases to a similar extent. As a result, economic performance is of ut-
most importance for long-term budgetary projections. All variables have
been calculated at constant 1995 prices.
The labour market projection depends to a large extent on the underly-
ing assumptions on participation rates (Table 3). It is assumed that for
the whole projection period the participation rate will stay constant at
the 2001 level for men in all cohorts (15–19, 20–54, 65–79) but one (55–64).
The participation rate for men aged 55 to 64 is expected to increase by 6 per-
centage points by 2007, reflecting the effects of theAct on Extending the Re-
tirement Age, and to remain at a higher level thereafter. The participation
rates reported for women in 2001 are kept constant up to 2007 except for
women aged 55 to 64, who are likely to withdraw from the labour market
later as the retirement age3 gradually increases up to 2007. From 2007 on,
the participation rates for women aged 20 to 54 and 55 to 64 were allowed
to rise4 towards a predefined threshold at the end of the period. The thres-
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3 The participation rate for women is expected to increase by 11 percentage points from 2001 to
2007. The rise in the participation rate for women, reflecting the later statutory retirement age,
is considerably higher than for men. While the retirement age will be extended by another year
for men (from 61 to 62), women will have to work two years longer to reach the statutory reti-
rement age (the age of retirement for a woman with two children will increase from 57 to 59
between 2001 and 2007). The rise in the participation rate is based on the assumption of almost
full efficiency of the increasing statutory retirement age, i.e. men and women will stay in the la-
bour force longer and will not rely on early retirement or disability schemes to a large extent.
Participation rate 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Men
0–14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15–19 16.2 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0
20–54 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3 92.3
55–64 53.6 59.5 59.5 59.5 59.5 59.5
65–79 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
80+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Women
0–14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
15–19 14.1 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2 10.2
20–54 78.6 80.3 82.1 83.8 85.6 87.3
55–64 23.3 36.0 39.4 42.8 46.1 49.5
65–79 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
80+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TABLE 3 Participation Rates for Men and Womenhold for women aged 20 to 54 was set equal to 5 percentage points below
that of men in the same cohort, and for women aged 55 to 64, 10 percen-
tage points below that of men.
From 2002 to 2006, the unemployment rate (measured by labour force
survey data) corresponds to the medium-term projection of the Ministry of
Finance. Starting in 2007, the unemployment rate is assumed to gradually
decrease, converging towards its structural level in 2015. Beyond 2015,
the unemployment rate is held constant at the structural level for the rest
of the projection period. The structural unemployment rate was set at 6.5 %,
a common assumption proposed by the OECD.
The participation rates determine the proportion of the population active
on the labour market (i.e. the labour force), and the unemployment rate was
used to calculate employment (Figure 2). Employment in 2007 will be high-
er than in 2001 and will amount to 4.9 million persons. The increase in 
employment results from higher participation rates for men and women
aged 55 to 64 and a reduction in the unemployment rate. From 2007, em-
ployment will experience a declining trend, falling to 4.3 million persons by
2030 and 3.5 million by 2050. The rising participation rate for women will
not come close to offsetting the unfavourable demographic trends. Between
2010 and 2015, the numerous cohorts of those born after World War II will
retire, but the largest fall in the working-age population will occur around
2035 when the baby boom generation of the 1970s withdraws from the la-
bour market.
The assumption on labour productivity growth is of crucial importance
for the projection exercise. The OECD wants labour productivity growth to
converge towards an annual rate of 1.75 % between 2020 and 2030. Labour
productivity in the Czech Republic is significantly lower than average EU
labour productivity, and convergence in levels is likely to appear. As a re-
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FIGURE 2 Employment and the Labour Force
4 The same assumption was applied by the OECD (2001) and EC (2001). The assumed increa-
ses in female participation rates stem from the higher participation of younger female age-co-










































Labour forcesult, labour productivity growth is assumed to significantly outstrip the la-
bour productivity growth in EU countries, so that the Czech Republic will
have reached over 80 % of the EU average by 2030. Labour productivity
growth is projected to be at 4.0 % in 2008 and to decline to 1.75 % in 2030.5
Labour productivity growth before 2007 was derived from the medium-term
forecast of the Ministry of Finance.
The GDP projection is a product of labour productivity and employment.
Under the given assumptions, GDP growth will reach 3.7 % on average in
the first decade of the projection period and decline in further decades as
labour productivity growth recedes and the decline in employment accele-
rates. Due to negative employment growth, GDP growth is substantially lo-
wer than growth in GDPper capita, reflecting population ageing and the pa-
rameters of the labour market.
The wage bill is an important variable for the fiscal module. The wage
bill, a product of the average wage and employment, is an input for the es-
timation of social security contributions. The average wage was not diffe-
rentiated by sex, and its growth was assumed to follow labour productivity
growth. As a result, the growth rate of the wage bill is equal to GDP growth.
All the assumptions and results used to project macroeconomic develop-
ments are summarised in Table 4.
4. Fiscal Projections
This section presents projections for the impact of an ageing population
on public expenditures. Many public expenditure programmes are affected
by demographic shifts. In the projection exercise, public expenditures were
divided into two subgroups – age-related expenditures and other expendi-
tures. The main spending items included in age-related expenditures are
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5 Assuming productivity growth rates that deviate from historical patterns can create an addi-
tional margin of uncertainty. In one of the sensitivity tests we present an impact of lower pro-
ductivity growth on the fiscal projection.
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Assumptions
Participation rate (20–64) (in %) 77.3 77.5 79.3 78.7 78.7 80.3
Unemployment rate (in %) 8.8 7.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
Labour productivity (growth rate in %) 2.2 3.4 3.4 1.9 1.8 1.8
Results
Employment (growth rate in %) -0.9 0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -1.0 -1.2
Wage rate (growth rate in %) 1.6 3.3 3.4 1.9 1.8 1.8
Wage bill (growth rate in %) 0.7 3.6 2.8 1.2 0.7 0.5
GDP (growth rate in %) 1.2 3.7 2.8 1.2 0.7 0.5
GDP per capita (growth rate in %) 1.3 3.7 3.0 1.6 1.4 1.3
TABLE 4 Assumptions and Results
Note: Growth rates are average growth rates in the given period (2010 is the average growth rate projected be-
tween 2001 and 2010), except for 2000 (average growth rate from 1995 to 2000).pensions, health care, education and child/family benefits. These expendi-
tures account for 53 % of the overall public spending in the Czech Repub-
lic. While ageing populations are likely to drive up pension spending and
health care costs, the shrinking youth age group may offset this rise by pro-
viding reductions in education expenditures and child/family benefits. As
a result, it is necessary to analyse all age-related spending to have a com-
plete picture of how population ageing impacts future public spending. How-
ever, projections of spending on health care and education are considerably
more uncertain than for pension expenditures. Pension legislation provides
a framework for estimating future benefits. No equivalent set of rules is
available for projecting the supply and demand of health care and educa-
tion.
The projections were based on an assumption of unchanged policy, and
as such, they only take into account the legislative acts in force (e.g.
the Act on Extending the Retirement Age). However, in some cases,
the fiscal projections rest on assumptions anticipating the likely mea-
sures in the legislative framework (i.e. systematic adjustments of re-
duction bands for derivation of pensions, and wage indexation of child/
/family benefits).
All fiscal data are reported in the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics
methodology (GFS), i.e. on a cash basis. Transformation costs were exclu-
ded from public spending because they are of a transitory nature and are
likely to disappear within several years. Thus, the deficit corresponds to
the deficit excluding financial operations (i.e. net lending in the GFS met-
hodology) and transformation costs. While 2003 (i.e. thebudget programme)
is the base year for the projection of revenues, total expenditures and pub-
lic debt, the projection of age-related expenditures starts off with the 2001
figures. All fiscal data were deflated by the GDP deflator, and subsequent
calculations were carried out in real terms.6
4.1 Basic Characteristics of the Czech Pension System
The pension system in the Czech Republic consists of two pillars. The first
pillar is represented by a mandatory state-operated PAYG defined benefit
scheme. The second pillar covers voluntary private pension funds. The pri-
vate scheme has been supplementing the public component of the pension
system since 1994, i.e. it is still a very immature system. Due to this fact,
the private pension pillar is negligible in financial terms,7 and in the next
paragraphs we will concentrate entirely on the state pension scheme. From
the financial point of view, the system has accumulated a deficit amounting
to about 1 % of GDP every year. While the revenue side seems to be quite
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6 In view of the uncertainties associated with the long-term inflation profile and the fact that,
over a sufficient period of time, inflation influences the revenue and expenditure side of gene-
ral government budgets in the same way, all figures were calculated at constant 1995 prices.
All past budgetary variables were deflated by the GDP deflator as a universal indicator of price
development.
7 At the end of 2001, the total assets of private pension funds were as low as 2.5 % of GDP.stable in terms of its share in GDP, theoverall spending increased by 1.3p.p.
during the last six years (Table 5).
The public pension system is universal for thewhole population, and there
are no differences according to the economic sectors in the Czech Republic.8
The system is mandatory for both employees and self-employed persons.
There is a linear contribution rate in the system at the level of 26 % of
the gross wage. In the case of employees, a part of it (19.5 %) is paid by
the employer and the rest (6.5 %) is paid directly by employees. The official
statutory retirement age has been gradually rising since 1996 (at a speed
of 2 months per calendar year for men and 4 months per year for women)
and will reach 62 years for men and 57 to 61 years (depending on the num-
ber of children) for women by 2007. The system also provides early retire-
ment vehicles allowing withdrawal from the labour market up to three 
years before reaching the statutory retirement age. The public pension pil-
lar provides four kinds of benefits – old-age (which represents the bulk of
the spending), disability, survivors’ and children’s pensions. The average
old-age replacement ratio (defined as the ratio of the average old-age pen-
sion to the average wage) has been approximately stable around 44 % in
relation to the gross average wage, or 57 % with respect to the net average
wage. Further details on the Czech pension system, as well as a discussion
of its weaknesses, are provided in, for example, (Bezdûk, 2000).
4.2 Pensions – the Baseline Model
The pension projection exercise covers several schemes including old-age
pensions, survivors’ and children’s pensions and disability pensions. Old-
-age pensions account for 72 % of total pension spending, and the rest is
made up of disability pensions, survivors’pensions and children’s pensions.
Up to 2001, all data (the total number of pensions, the average pension,
the number of new pensions and the average new pension) were taken from
the CSSZ9 Statistical Yearbook.
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Revenue Expenditure Balance Revenue Expenditure Balance
(CZK bn) (% GDP)
1996 133.9 129.5 +4.4 8.5 8.3 +0.3
1997 146.3 152.8 -6.5 8.7 9.1 -0.4
1998 156.3 168.8 -12.5 8.5 9.2 -0.7
1999 161.8 181.3 -19.4 8.5 9.5 -1.0
2000 170.5 186.8 -16.4 8.6 9.4 -0.8
2001 186.0 201.0 -15.0 8.6 9.3 -0.7
2002 197.7 217.3 -19.7 8.7 9.6 -0.9
TABLE 5 Financial Performance of the State Pension System
Source: Czech Ministry of Finance
8 Certain exceptions to this rule are the pensions of the armed forces (military, police and cus-
toms officers). However, those expenditures represent only a very small proportion of the total
pension spending (about 2.5 %).Major attention was paid to old-age pensions, due to their relative im-
portance and share in total pension spending. The old-age pension projec-
tion estimates the flow of new pensions and the average pension. The cur-
rent stock of pensions is treated separately. The flow of new pensions was
projected separately for men and women on the basis of participation ra-
tes, which were used to calibrate the number of new pensions as a percen-
tage of the total number of men and women in a particular cohort. It has
been assumed that the average pension at the time of retirement is a fixed
proportion of the average wage, i.e. the replacement ratio is kept stable at
the 2001 level of 60.2 % for men and 51.3 % for women.10
The following chart shows the number of pensions for men and women
from 1996 to 2050. As can be observed, the number of old-age pensions will
rise as the population ages and the old-age dependency ratio increases.
The highest increase is likely to appear between 2010 and 2020, when
the large post-war cohorts reach the age of retirement. As of 2020, the num-
ber of old-age pensions will be flat for both men and women, but it will start
rising again in 2030 for women and 2033 for men. The rise is more pro-
nounced for men than for women. The number of pensions will stabilise and
subsequently fall after 2040 (see Figure 3).
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9 CSSZ denotes the Czech Social Security Office, an institution in charge of social security ad-
ministration.
10 The replacement ratio refers here to the ratio of the average pension at the time of retire-
ment as reported in 2001 by the CSSZ to the average gross macroeconomic wage. The gross
macroeconomic wage is defined here as the ratio of the gross wage bill to employment (sum of
employees and the self-employed). Due to the inclusion of the self-employed in the denomina-
tor, the macroeconomic wage is considerably lower than the average wage reported by the Czech
Statistical Office (CZSO). As a result, the replacement ratio applied in the projection exercise
is higher than that reported by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. If the gross average
wage reported by the CZSO were applied, the replacement ratio would amount to 51.9 % for
men, 41.1 % for women and 44.9 % for all new old-age pensions originated in 2001. Moreover,
the replacement ratio presented in the main text does not contain old-age pensions drawn be-
fore the statutory retirement age (the respective replacement ratios for temporary and perma-
nently reduced old-age pensions applied in the projection exercise amount to 50.3 % and 51.0 %
for men and 39.8 % and 41.4 % for women).The evolution of the ratio of the average pension to the average wage
over time depends on the indexation mechanism, the relative weights of
ordinary old-age pensions, temporary and permanently reduced old-age
pensions, and on the relation between the flow of new pensions and
the stock of pensions. The Czech government has substantial discretion in
setting the indexation formulae, as the law stipulates the minimum inde-
xation requirements only. In the past indexation, the aim was to stabilise
or even raise the average pension to average wage ratio. In the projection
exercise, three indexation mechanisms were assumed: (i) price indexation
(i.e. a constant pension in real terms), (ii) wage indexation and (iii) inde-
xation to prices plus 1/3 of real wage increases. Full indexing to wages af-
ter retirement exists in only a few countries. However, because retirement
benefits are based on past earnings in the Czech Republic, earnings-rela-
ted pensions grow with earnings and productivity even if pensions are not
indexed to wages for those in retirement. Under earnings-related schemes
with price indexing of pensions, the ratio of the average pension to the ave-
rage wage does not fall indefinitely as the cohorts of new pensioners whose
pensions were derived from their earnings replace the cohorts of old pen-
sioners receiving pensions indexed to prices. Figure 4 and  5 compare
the evolution of the average pension to average wage ratio up to 2050 for
men and women under the aforementioned indexation mechanisms, and
Figure 6 shows total old-age pension spending under the various indexa-
tion mechanisms.
Due to the unfavourable demographic trends, old-age pension spending
will rise steeply in the coming decades. The government decision on the in-
dexation formulae will affect the level of pension spending. Under wage in-
dexation, old-age pension expenditure will rise monotonically, reaching al-
most 14 % of GDP by 2050. If wage indexation is abandoned and pensions
are indexed to prices only, old-age pension spending will be contained be-
tween 6 and 7 % of GDP up to 2020. Between 2010 and 2020, large cohorts
will retire and the effect of the falling ratio of the average pension to the ave-
rage wage for those in retirement will diminish. This will result in rising
pension spending as a percentage of GDP, but old-age pension spending will
be 2.5 percentage points lower in 2050 as compared to the full wage inde-
xation variant. Indexation to prices and 1/3 real wage increases lead to si-
milar results and patterns of pension spending. But the average pension to
average wage ratio will not decline to such an extent, and pension spending
will be 1 percentage point higher than in the price indexation variant. To
sum up, future old-age pension spending is to a large extent dependent on
the indexation formulae applied. In the projection of the fiscal deficit and
debt, the “middle variant” will be used, i.e. indexation to prices plus 1/3 real
wage increases.
In addition to old-age pensions, the other pension expenditures (survi-
vors’ and children’s pensions and disability pensions) were analysed. Dis-
ability pensions account for 18 % of total pension spending, while child-
ren’s pensions amount to 1.2 % and survivors’pensions to 8.7 % of total pension
expenditures. It was assumed that the number of disabled persons depends
on the size and age profile of the population. The number of survivors’ pen-
sions was derived from the number of old-age pensions and the number of
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FIGURE 4 Evolution of the Average Pension to Average Wage Ratio for Men under Various In-
dexation Mechanisms
FIGURE 5 Evolution of the Average Pension to Average Wage Ratio for Women under Various
Indexation Mechanisms






















































































































4,0 %children’s pensions was related to the number of children. The projection of
total pension spending is shown in Table 6.
Under the assumption of the real wage bill growing at the same pace as
real GDP and proportionality between pension contributions and the wage
bill, pension contributions will equal 8.8 % of GDP and the ratio will be con-
stant for the whole projection period. Keeping in mind the steep rise in pen-
sion spending as a percentage of GDP under full indexation to wages, there
will be a considerable rise in the pension system deficit throughout the pe-
riod. Under indexation to prices and 1/3 wage increases, the deficit of
the pension system will be stabilised until 2015, but in subsequent decades
it will start to rise rapidly as the age profile of the population shifts towards
a larger and larger share of the elderly. Price indexation of pensions leads to
similar results, with the pension system deficit a further 1 % of GDP lower.
4.3 Pensions – Alternative Model
Public pension spending in the Czech Republic amounts to almost 10 %
of GDP, which is equal to only slightly less than one quarter of all general
government expenditure. Any analysis of the sensitivity of the fiscal posi-
tion to the process of population ageing is, therefore, crucially dependent
on the public pension outlay projections. Keeping this factor in mind, we
have decided to include another pension model in this paper to test the ro-
bustness of our baseline pension projection introduced in the previous sec-
tion.
This alternative model was developed in (Bezdûk, 2000). For the purpo-
ses of this paper, we have further improved the structure of the model and
updated its data inputs. From a technical point of view, the alternative pen-
sion model is of a less detailed structure than the baseline model. In parti-
cular, it does not allow us to work with the participation rates of the indi-
vidual age cohorts, since the model structure relies on more aggregated
data. On the other hand, the alternative model introduces some new para-
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2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Wage indexation
Old-age pensions 6.6 8.0 9.5 10.5 12.2 13.7
Other pensions 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.7
Total pension spending 9.3 10.8 12.5 13.7 15.7 17.3
Price indexation
Old-age pensions 6.6 6.4 6.8 8.0 10.0 11.2
Other pensions 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.1
Total pension spending 9.3 8.7 9.1 10.5 12.8 14.3
Indexation to prices and 1/3 wage
increases
Old-age pensions 6.6 6.9 7.6 8.7 10.6 12.0
Other pensions 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.3
Total pension spending 9.3 9.4 10.1 11.4 13.7 15.2
TABLE 6 Total Pension Spending as a Percentage of GDPmeters that have not been considered in the baseline pension projections.
On the revenue side, the model takes into account the differences between
employees and the self-employed,11 and the model also assumes that a cer-
tain part of the contributions will not in fact be collected, due to tax ar-
rears. On the expenditure side, the alternative model assumes, besides pen-
sion benefits themselves, the existence of administrative costs in the pub-
lic pension system. It also takes into account the pension outlays of the ar-
med forces. The values of all these parameters have been calibrated with
respect to reality in the second half of the 1990s.
All other parameters and data inputs have been unified in line with theas-
sumptions of the baseline pension model. In particular, both models use
the same demographic database, and the macroeconomic scenario is also
identical (i.e. GDP growth, rate of unemployment, real interest rates on go-
vernment debt, labour productivity growth and wage growth). Both models
reflect the gradual shifting of the statutory retirement age up to 2007. Si-
milarly to the baseline model, the alternative model also assumes that
the relation of “non-old-age” average pension benefits with respect to
the average old-age pension will remain stable over time. The number of
disabled people will correspond to the size and age profile of the population.
The number of survivors’ beneficiaries goes hand in hand with the number
of old-age pensions and the number of children’s pensions is a function of
the number of youths. Thus, all data inputs for both models were unified
and these differ only in terms of their in-built structure. This makes it pos-
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2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Wage indexation:
Old-age pensions 6,8 7,6 9,3 10,6 12,7 14,0
Other pensions 2,8 3,1 3,5 3,7 4,1 4,2
Total pension spending 9,6 10,8 12,8 14,3 16,8 18,2
Price indexation:
Old-age pensions 6,8 6,1 6,8 8,3 10,7 11,9
Other pensions 2,8 2,5 2,6 2,9 3,4 3,6
Total pension spending 9,6 8,7 9,4 11,2 14,1 15,5
Indexation to prices and 1/3 wage
increases:
Old-age pensions 6,8 6,6 7,6 9,0 11,4 12,7
Other pensions 2,8 2,7 2,8 3,1 3,7 3,9
Total pension spending 9,6 9,3 10,4 12,1 15,0 16,6
TABLE 7 Total Pension Spending as a Percentage of GDP – Alternative Model
Note: Contrary to the baseline pension model, the old-age pension projection accounts for armed forces benefits,
which amounted to 0.2 % of GDP in 2000 (and may reach about 0.4 % GDP in 2050). “Other pensions” in the al-
ternative model assume, moreover, the administrative costs of the public pension scheme (0.1 %–0.2 % of
GDP), which are not included in the baseline pension model.
11 Under Czech law, the self-employed are allowed to pay relatively lower contributions than
the average employee. The contribution rate is equal in both cases, but the way of calculating
the contribution base is different. Moreover, in the case of the self-employed, Czech law intro-
duces a ceiling on the contribution premium, whereas in the case of employees, the contribu-
tion rate is applied to the total gross wage without any limitations.sible to check both pension models for robustness of the projections. The re-
sults of the alternative model are summarised in Table 7.
It is quite obvious that the alternative model delivers very similar pro-
jections when compared to the baseline pension model estimates. The dif-
ference between the two models in total pension spending over a 50 year
period is only about 1 % of GDP, depending on the indexation mechanism.
This is rather negligible given the enormous margins of error surrounding
this kind of long-term projection exercise. Moreover, almost half of that
dis-crepancy stems from the different approach to the expenditure side in
the two models, which was discussed earlier. In other words, the alterna-
tive pension projections seem to confirm the robustness of the results of
the baseline pension model. This is definitely a welcome conclusion for
the purposes of testing the expected impact of ageing on the overall fiscal
position.
4.4 Health Care
Health care spending is another expenditure category that is likely to be
unfavourably affected by population ageing. Total health care outlays in
the Czech Republic amount to about 7 % of GDP and are almost entirely of
a public nature.12 Thus, public health care spending represents almost one
sixth of all general government expenditure. Projections of health care spen-
ding (partly including the costs of caring for the frail elderly) are consider-
ably more uncertain than for pension expenditure, due to the absence of le-
gislation providing a framework for estimating future benefits. Further-
more, there is a great deal of uncertainty on what demographic features are
actually important for driving health care spending up – in particular, whe-
ther or not it is important having more people who are relatively old or ha-
ving more people in the final years of their lives (OECD, 2001). The health
care projection was based on per capita health care spending in each age
group multiplied by the number of people in that age group. Figure 7 shows
average expenditure per head as a share of GDP per capita.
Data on the age and sex profiles of health care costs were provided by
the General Health Insurance Company of the Czech Republic (GHIC) and
cover about 70 % of the population. The GHIC calculated the age and sex
profiles for 2000, and the data were further broken down by acute and long-
-term care. The average health care expenditure per head in the chart con-
tains both acute and long-term care. The chart clearly shows that expen-
diture per head rises progressively with the age of the person, reaching
the peak in the final years of life. As a result, health care spending will sig-
nificantly raise public expenditure, as the largest increase in population
size is projected to take place amongst the very old (population aged 80 and
above).
Health care spending in the projection exercise includes all public health
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12 Private health care payments as a share in GDP are very low in the Czech Republic from
an international point of view. More information on the Czech health care system from the in-
ternational perspective can be found in (Bezdûk, 2002).care expenditure for both acute and long-term care. Thus, spending on theel-
derly is reflected in the long-term health care costs, but another part of
the care for the frail elderly is financed through social programmes. Due to
a lack of data on social spending on care for the frail elderly, part of this ex-
penditure has been neglected.
The health care projection was carried out separately for acute and long-
-term care and for men and women. Acute and long-term care was projec-
ted as a product of average expenditure per head in a particular cohort,
the size of the cohort and the trend growth rate of health expenditure per
head. The trend growth rate of health expenditure per head was set equal
to the growth rate of GDP per capita. This assumption may underestimate
the future health care costs, as health expenditures per head tend to rise
faster than GDP per capita13. The rise will be further reinforced by con-
vergence of health care spending (especially its wage component) towards
EU levels. On the other hand, health care costs per capita depend on age
and rise steeply in the final years of life. Increasing longevity will shift
thecurve plotting per capita spending as afunction of age to theright, which
may offset the higher-than-assumed growth rate of per capita spending.
The age profile of the health expenditure (as shown in Figure 7) underes-
timates the total health care spending as reported in the functional classi-
fication of expenditures in the Government Finance Statistics. As a result,
the age profiles have been calibrated so that they generate estimates of 
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FIGURE 7 Average Health Care Expenditure per Head as a Share of GDP per capita



























































































































































13 The ratio of health care expenditure to GDP increased from 6.5 % in 1996 to 6.7 % in 2001.
While GDP per capita increased by 1.1 % on average, real health care expenditure adjusted for
demographic changes rose by 1.2 % in the same period. The difference is relatively small, but
it has to be emphasised that the comparison was made over a very short period and the figures
are biased by the economic recession of 1997–1999 and the 1997/1998 spending cuts.health expenditure in line with estimates of health care from macro sour-
ces for the year 2000.14
Table 8 indicates that health care spending will become another source of
future expenditure pressures resulting from population ageing. Total 
health care spending will increase by almost 2 % of GDP by 2050. The rise
in health care spending is driven by the rapidly increasing number of the
elderly, who consume the largest portion of health services. The rise in 
health care spending may even be higher, because it has been assumed 
that the growth of average health expenditure per head will be equal to
the growth rate of GDP per capita. As the quality (and financial require-
ments) of health services is increasing rapidly, the assumption may lie on
the optimistic side.
4.5 Education
Education expenditures are a spending category that is likely to offset, to
some extent, the spending pressures stemming from increasing pension and
health care spending. Education expenditures are related to the number of
school-aged youths, who will account for a declining proportion of the Czech
population. The size of the population aged 0 to 26 will fall by 46 % from
2000 to 2050. Such a rapid decline in the youth population indicates a po-
tential area for substantial spending containment. However, the scope for
spending containment may be reduced by lower efficiency (smaller average
class sizes) and improvements in quality (implementation of new technolo-
gies, etc.).
Education expenditures were projected in a similar way as health care
spending. Education expenditures are expressed as a product of average ex-
penditure per head in each particular school cohort, the size of the cohort
and the trend growth rate of expenditure per head. Education expenditure
per head was derived from the data given in the Statistical Yearbook of
theCzech Republic (CZSO, 1999–2002), which contains thenumber of child-
ren and students in various education facilities (nursery schools, primary
schools, grammar schools, other secondary schools and universities) and to-
tal expenditure for the particular form of education. Figure 8 shows the ave-
rage education expenditure per head derived as the ratio of expenditure for
education in 2001 to the average number of children and students in
the school years 2000/2001 and 2001/2002.
The projection divided education expenditure into four categories – nur-
sery schools, primary schools, secondary schools and universities, i.e. gram-
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2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Acute care 5.7 6.1 6.6 6.9 7.2 7.3
Long-term care 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
Total health care spending 6.6 7.0 7.6 8.0 8.4 8.5
TABLE 8 Health Care Spending as a Percentage of GDP
14 The value of the adjustment coefficient (or scaling factor) was equal to 1.217 for acute care
and 1.056 for long-term care.mar schools, secondary technical schools and secondary vocational schools
were aggregated – and average expenditure per head was calculated as
a weighted average. It was assumed that the share of university students
will double15 by 2050, reaching 30 % of those aged 19 to 26. The number of
primary and secondary school pupils is not expected to change. Further-
more, the growth rate of education expenditure per head is projected to
equal the growth rate of GDP per capita, reflecting the improving quality
of education.
Education expenditure as a percentage of GDP will decline by 0.6 per-
centage points (see Table 9). The decline is considerably lower than the dec-
lining school population indicates. It results from the fact that average ex-
penditure per head rises with GDP per capita and the share of university
students is assumed to rise over time.
4.6 Child/Family Benefits
Child/family benefits encompass a wide range of benefits directed to fa-
milies with children. Some of the benefits are means tested, while others
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FIGURE 8 Average Education Expenditure per Head as a Share of GDP per capita









































































15 In the period of 1998 to 2001, the share of university students increased by one percentage
point ayear. According to international statistics, students enrolled in tertiary education account
for 12 % of all pupils and students enrolled in the Czech education system (EC, 2002 – chap-
ter F, p. 5). The corresponding number for EU countries is 15 %, with fairly large differences
across countries (12 % in Germany and 21 % in Greece, Spain and Finland). In the EU, on ave-
rage, the number of students in tertiary education has more than doubled over the last 25 years.
The assumption used in the projection exercise, although not directly comparable to the inter-
national statistics mentioned, seems to be reasonable, as the trend of higher enrolment in ter-
tiary education is likely to persist into the future.are paid irrespective of the income of the family. The benefits included un-
der child/family benefits in the projection exercise are child allowances, so-
cial allowances, transportation allowances, parental allowances, maternity
grants and maternity benefits. Except for maternity benefits, which are part
of the social security system based on the insurance principle, the other be-
nefits are provided within the system of state social support. As the num-
ber of children will decline, spending on child/family benefits is likely to be
affected by these demographic shifts.
The number of benefits was derived from the number of children entitled
to receive the benefits. In principle, entitlement to each of the benefits is
governed by different parameters (age of the child, income of the family and
other conditions, as in the case of schools transportation allowance). It was
assumed that the shares of those entitled in the size of the respective co-
hort will not change. The shares (in the case of means-tested benefits) were
calibrated on the basis of the average benefit and data from the household
survey. Another assumption was that the average benefit to average wage
ratio would be maintained.
Under these assumptions, child/family benefits will decrease by 0.3 % of
GDP by 2050, with a somewhat larger decline in the middle of the projec-
tion period (Table 10). Child/family benefits do not fall significantly, as
the average benefit is indexed to wages and the drop in the number of child-
ren is offset by an increasing eligibility ratio with regard to child benefit
and transport benefit resulting from the increasing share of university stu-
dents.
4.7 Other Spending and Public Revenues
Non-age-related spending and taxes were kept constant as a share of GDP
at the 2003 level (budget programme). The ratio of primary non-age-rela-
ted expenditures to GDP will remain unchanged at the 2003 level of 21.5 %.
Due to an assumed decline in the unemployment rate, the number of unem-
ployment benefit entitlements was allowed to drop. Unemployment bene-
fits account for a very small proportion of total expenditures and are ex-
pected to amount to 0.3 % of GDP in the 2003 budget programme, fall to
0.2 % of GDP in 2006 and remain at a lower level thereafter.
Social security contributions in theCzech Republic are related to thewage
bill. As the wage bill grows proportionally to GDP growth in the projection
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2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Education expenditure 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5
TABLE 9 Education expenditure as percentage of GDP
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Child family benefits 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3
TABLE 10 Child/Family Benefits as a Percentage of GDPexercise, social security contributions16 make up a constant proportion of
GDP (14.9 %). The ratio of other taxes and revenues to GDP was fixed at
the 2003 level.17 As a result, total general government revenues remain at
the 2003 level of 39.8 % of GDP.
The assumption of constant revenue and other expenditure as a percen-
tage of GDP is convenient for evaluating the impact of population ageing
on the public deficit and debt. It allows age-related spending to fully affect
the primary deficit/surplus and debt with second-round effects through in-
terest payments. The real interest rate applied for computation of interest
payments was set at 4 %.
4.8 Results
In this subsection, the projections of age-related spending, other spending
and revenues will be put together, and the impact of population ageing on
the primary balance and debt will be examined. The strongest pressure on
public expenditure stems from pension spending and health care. These two
spending items will raise public spending by 7.8 % of GDP up to 2050.
The rise in public spending will be somewhat mitigated by a drop in edu-
cation expenditure and child/family benefits. The results of the projection
exercise are summarised in Table 11.
The impact of population ageing on the budget position is significantly af-
fected by the starting position, in particular for the primary deficit. For
countries with a primary deficit, like the Czech Republic, as opposed to
countries with primary surpluses, rising age-related spending leads to
a further rise in deficits and debt. Thus, early increases in government sa-
vings can significantly attenuate the coming demographic shock (OECD,
2001). Unfortunately, the opposite has happened in the Czech Republic.
The primary balance has further deteriorated since 2000 and is expected
to reach 4.8 % in 2003, the base year for the projection exercise.
In the first decade of the projection, the primary balance improves, as
education expenditure and child/family benefits decline in per cent of GDP
and the impact of population ageing on pension spending is not yet that ap-
parent. From 2010, the primary deficit starts rising from the level of 4.3 %
of GDP, reaching 7.1 % of GDPin 2030 and 11.3 % of GDPin 2050. The high-
est increase in primary deficit is likely to occur between 2030 and 2040.
The primary deficit stabilises at the very end of the projection period. Aper-
manent primary deficit of large magnitude results in a ballooning debt,
which is projected to reach 50 % of GDP in 2009, 100 % in 2018 and 300 %
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16 In the GFS 86 methodology, social security contributions are consolidated and account for a low-
er share in GDP as compared to the National Accounts (ESA95). This results from the fact that
contributions paid by the government for its employees are part of both compensation to em-
ployees on the expenditure side and social security contributions on the revenue side. When as-
sessing thepension system deficit, gross contributions should be considered anincome to thesys-
tem. In 2003, gross pension contributions are expected to amount to 8.8 % of GDP, and all social
security contributions to 16.1 % of GDP.
17 Public pensions are not subject to taxation in the Czech Republic, and the importance of
the private pension pillar is negligible for the time being.in 2035. In 2050, the public debt would be close to 700 % of GDP. It is ob-
vious that such an explosive rise in public debt (Figure 9) cannot be su-
stained.
It should be made explicit that therapid accumulation of debt is not there-
sult of population ageing only, but results from a poor starting position. If
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FIGURE 9 Public Deficit and Debt as a Percentage of GDP from 1995 to 2050
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Pension spending
Old-age pensions 6.6 6.9 7.6 8.7 10.6 12.0
Other pensions 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.7 3.0 3.3
Total pension spending 9.3 9.4 10.1 11.4 13.7 15.2
Other age-related expenditure
Health care 6.6 7.0 7.6 8.0 8.4 8.5
Education expenditure 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5
Child family benefits 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3
Total other age-related spending 12.3 12.3 12.5 12.9 13.2 13.4
Total age-related spending 21.5 21.6 22.6 24.3 26.8 28.6
Other gen. government spending 20.1 22.6 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5
Total spending 41.6 44.2 45.1 46.9 49.4 51.2
Revenues
Social security contributions 14.5 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9
Other gen. government revenue 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9 24.9
Total revenue 39.3 39.8 39.8 39.8 39.8 39.8
Primary balance -2.3 -4.3 -5.3 -7.1 -9.6 -11.3
Debt interest payments 1.1 1.9 4.1 8.1 14.9 25.7
Debt 16.7 55.0 112.5 217.8 397.3 680.6
TABLE 11 Impact of Population Ageing on Public Spending, Revenues, the Balance and Debt 
in Per cent of GDP





































































Primary deficit (as % of GDP)
Debt cumulation (as % of GDP)the primary deficit were removed by 2007,18 the public debt would be 60 %
lower in 2050, i.e. 280 % of GDP, which may better represent the impact
of population ageing on the primary deficit and debt. On the other hand,
this sensitivity test indicates that even a considerably more favourable 
level of the primary deficit is not enough to prevent the debt from rising 
steeply.
Another way of analysing the long-term sustainability of public finances
is to compute synthetic indicators of the budgetary adjustment needed to
stabilise the debt level. The most widely used synthetic indicator is the tax
gap. The tax gap measures the difference between the current tax-to-GDP
ratio and the constant tax-to-GDP ratio ensuring that public debt will not
exceed a predetermined level. As the projection was carried out up to 2050
and extending the projection beyond 2050 requires additional assumptions
on the evolution of age-related expenditures, the calculation of the tax gap
was restricted to the requirement that the public debt will not exceed a pre-
determined level at 2050. The target debt level was arbitrarily set equal to
60 % of GDP, i.e. the Maastricht criterion on public debt. Should the go-
vernment adjust the tax-to-GDP ratio in 2005, they would have to raise ta-
xes by 6.8 % of GDPnot to break the Maastricht debt level in 2050. If the de-
cision is postponed till 2015, the fiscal adjustment needed is considerably
higher and amounts to 9.8 % of GDP (Figure 10). The tax gap would furt-
her increase beyond 2015. Clearly, the current fiscal policy setting is un-
sustainable in the long run. To reverse the unfavourable trend would re-
quire anenormous increase in thetax-to-GDPratio, which would undermine
the potential for growth.
It is interesting to compare the impact of population ageing on age-rela-
ted expenditures with other European countries. The European Commis-
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18 The reduction can be achieved through tax increases or, preferably, through a reduction in 
other expenditures.sion published its most up-to-date long-term projections in 2001 (EC, 2001).
The EC cooperated closely with the OECD and used identical or very si-
milar demographic and macroeconomic assumptions. Moreover, the same
methodology was applied, which further contributes to the international
comparability of our results and those presented by the EC. It was docu-
mented that the Czech Republic belongs to the group of fast ageing count-
ries. This has consequences for the evolution of pension and health care
spending, which are the major items driving public expenditure up. It is
apparent from Table 12 that the Czech pension system will be severely hit
by population ageing and pension spending will rise rapidly even in com-
parison with other countries facing unfavourable demographic develop-
ment. This result can be partly attributed to the fact that pension spen-
ding continues rising even beyond 2030, while spending increases are
contained or even turn negative in other European countries. Dampening
demographic pressures in EU countries beyond 2030 and the introduction
of pension reforms in many European countries can explain the difference
in the pattern of pension spending. In the Czech Republic, a consensus over
pension reform has not yet been reached; the reform has been postponed
and only minor parametric changes have been phased in. On the other
hand, the increase in health care spending can be considered average vis-
-à-vis EU countries.
4.9 Sensitivity Analysis and Policy Simulations
Sensitivity analysis is an important part of long-term projections, as
the final outcome is very much dependent on the assumptions applied. 
To check the robustness and the degree of uncertainty of the projection re-
sults, several sensitivity tests were performed. These tests were focused on
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Selected EU  2000 2030 2050 Change in p. points
countries Pensions Health- Pensions Health- Pensions Health- Pensions Health-
care care care care
Austria 14.5 5.8 18.1 7.5 17.0 8.5 2.5 2.7
Belgium 10.0 6.1 13.3 7.6 13.3 8.1 3.3 2.0
Finland 11.3 6.2 14.9 8.3 15.9 9.0 4.6 2.8
France 12.1 6.9 16.0 8.1 15.8 8.5 3.7 1.6
Germany* 11.8 5.7 15.5 6.7 16.9 7.1 5.1 1.4
Italy 13.8 5.5 15.7 6.9 14.1 7.5 0.3 2.0
Netherlands 7.9 7.2 13.1 9.1 13.6 10.3 5.7 3.1
Portugal* 9.8 5.4 13.6 5.8 13.2 6.1 3.4 0.7
Spain* 9.4 5.5 12.6 6.5 17.3 7.2 7.9 1.7
Sweden 9.0 8.8 11.4 10.6 10.7 11.8 1.7 3.0
United Kingdom 5.5 6.3 5.2 7.3 4.4 8.2 -1.1 1.9
Czech Republic 9.3 6.6 11.4 8.0 15.2 8.5 5.9 1.9
TABLE 12 International Comparison of Fiscal Projections – Per cent of GDP
Note: Results for public spending on long-term care are not available for all countries. Countries denoted by an as-
terisk publish projections for health care (excluding long-term care) only. Coverage of both pension and 
health care spending is not fully comparable across countries.
Source: (EC, 2001)the macroeconomic assumptions, and an isolated change in a given para-
meter only was considered. The following sensitivity tests were undertaken:
– Lower productivity: Productivity growth was set 0.5percentage points low-
er than in the baseline starting in 2008.
– Lower unemployment rate: The structural unemployment rate was low-
ered from 6.5 % to 4.0 %, which was the unemployment rate observed
in 1996/1997. The fall in the unemployment rate is assumed to be slow.
It converges from 6.5 % towards 4.0 % at the end of the projection pe-
riod.
– Lower participation rate: It was assumed that the convergence of female
participation rates towards those of men will not occur, unlike in the ba-
seline. As a result, the female participation rate (20–64) is over 10 per-
centage points lower as compared to the baseline and the total participa-
tion rate (20–64) is 5 percentage points lower at the end of the projection
period.
The lower productivity growth results directly in lower GDP growth but
at the same time in slower growth of the average wage, as productivity
growth determines the growth rate of the average wage. The evolution of
the average wage is an important determinant of the average pension at
the time of retirement. While the lower level of GDP will tend to raise pen-
sion spending as a percentage of GDP, the lower average wage will cause
a fall in the average pension and consequently in the volume of pension
spending. However, the final outcome will be negative and pension spen-
ding will increase as a percentage of GDP. The explanation rests on the fact
that the stock of pensions in the sensitivity scenario consists of both “new”
lower average pensions from the period of lower productivity growth (as
compared to the baseline), but also of “old” pensions at the same average
level as those in the baseline (from the period before productivity growth
was lowered). When compared to the baseline, the “old” pensions are high-
er in relation to the “new” pensions, which drives pension spending up as
a percentage of GDP. Other spending items are not significantly affected by
lower productivity growth, as the trend growth of spending per head (health
care and education) is related to GDP growth. Thus, the fall in GDP (de-
nominator) is offset by the drop in the given spending item (nominator).
The total impact of lower productivity growth on public expenditure and
the primary deficit is limited to 0.6 % of GDP as compared to the baseline.
Another sensitivity test was focused on the impact of a lower unemploy-
ment rate on the public deficit. The falling unemployment rate raises em-
ployment and GDP growth vis-à-vis the baseline. There is no direct effect
of the lower unemployment rate on pension spending, but it drops as a per-
centage of GDP due to the higher GDP growth. The lower unemployment
leads to a fall in the number of unemployment benefits and child/family be-
nefits. In this scenario, the public deficit is lower by 0.5 % of GDP.
The last sensitivity test was aimed at investigating the impact of a lower
(female) participation rate. Unlike the fall in the unemployment rate,
the lower participation rate reduces employment through a smaller work-
force. As labour productivity is fixed, the lower employment brings about
a decrease in GDP as compared to the baseline. The lower GDP is com-
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ployment benefits. But the negative effect of the lower participation rate on
GDP outweighs the fall in the pension eligibility ratio and the number of
unemployment benefits. In this scenario, the primary deficit is higher by
0.6 % of GDP.
The results of the sensitivity tests are summarised in Figure 11. We pre-
fer to present the impact of the sensitivity tests on the primary deficit, as
the debt level reflects the cumulative impact of the changes over several 
years or decades and we want to see the impact on public spending at a gi-
ven point in time. Moreover, we have emphasised that the high end-period
debt level is a result of the currently high primary deficit, which is not re-
lated to population ageing. On the basis of Figure 11 we can conclude that
the impact of the sensitivity test on the primary balance is fairly limited
and surprisingly19 similar in magnitude.
Besides the sensitivity tests, several policy simulations were undertaken.
Policy-makers have several options for containing the future spending pres-
sures stemming from population ageing. Leaving aside fundamental pen-
sion and health care reforms requiring a broad policy consensus, substan-
tial savings can be achieved through parametric changes to the current
systems, and early primary deficit reductions can provide room for future
fiscal manoeuvre. Four options were examined:
– Primary deficit reduction: At present the Czech Republic reports a high
primary deficit, which is leading to a rapid accumulation of debt irre-
spective of the future rise in age related-spending. It was assumed that
the primary deficit is removed in 2007.20
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19 No a priori attempt was made to calibrate the parameter changes so as to generate similar
deviations from the baseline.
20 We referred to this option in subsection 4.8 as we tried to show the isolated impact of popu-
lation ageing on public finance sustainability.





























1995       2000       2005       2010       2015        2020       2025       2030       2035       2040        2045       2050– Indexation of pensions to prices: In this policy scenario pensions were in-
dexed to prices rather than to prices plus one third of real wage growth
as in the baseline.
– Lower replacement ratio: The ratio of the average pension to the average
wage at the time of retirement was reduced by 5 percentage points.
– Extension of the retirement age: Beyond 2007 an extension of the retire-
ment age was phased in with the aim of increasing the retirement age to
65 years for both men and women. The retirement age was lengthened by
3 months a year for men and 4 months for women. Under this assump-
tion men will retire at 65 from 2019 on and women (with two children)
from 2025 on.
Figure 12 shows the results of the policy simulations. It is apparent that
an early fiscal adjustment reducing the primary deficit makes it possible to
better face the future fiscal pressures. Fiscal consolidation is a precondi-
tion for fiscal sustainability. Indexation of pensions to prices and a reduc-
tion in the replacement ratio help contain pension spending. The simula-
tions indicate that the lower replacement ratio and indexation to prices
reduce pension spending and the primary deficit by 1.4 % and 0.7 % of GDP
respectively. On the other hand, these measures could impair the welfare
of the elderly. In such a case, the reduction in the primary deficit may be
lower as some pensioners may become dependent on social assistance and
state social support programmes.
The extension of the retirement age is the most efficient measure for ge-
nerating budgetary savings. The higher retirement age leads to a fall in
the primary deficit by 2.2 % of GDP. We have to point out that the reduc-
tion in the primary deficit is achieved through a fall in pension spending
only. In reality, the extension of the retirement age not only contains pen-
sion spending, but also results in a higher participation rate, which has a fa-
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Lower replacement ratio
Price indexation of wages
Baseline
Reduction in primary 
deficit
Higher retirement agevourable impact on employment and GDP growth. Higher employment will
raise the wage bill and bring in additional revenues for the government. In
our simulation, the positive effect of the higher retirement age on the la-
bour market was switched off, as we were trying to demonstrate the isola-
ted impact on pension spending.21
5. Conclusion
Long-term projections have become an important instrument for asses-
sing public finance sustainability, and their importance has been further
strengthened by the challenges posed by population ageing. Population age-
ing will have serious consequences for fiscal policy formulation in most de-
veloped countries. The Czech Republic will be strongly hit by a demogra-
phic shock, as its population will be ageing rapidly. Acomparison with other
OECD countries shows that the Czech Republic ranks as one of the fastest
ageing countries. To examine the likely impact of population ageing on fu-
ture fiscal imbalances under the current policy settings, projections of
the main age-related expenditures have been carried out. The projection
exercise is an extension of similar exercises focusing on pension spending
only. It covers projection of health care costs, education expenditure and
child/family benefits.
All long-term projections are very uncertain, as small changes in starting
values or in key parameters and assumptions can have a large impact on
the projections, in particular the further out the projection goes. However,
an alternative model of the public pension system confirmed the relative
robustness of the baseline model’s pension projections. Each of the calcula-
tions should be regarded not as a forecast, but rather as a projection of
the possible outcome under explicit assumptions. The projection indicates
that the cumulative effect of population ageing on the labour market and
public finances will be profound. However, from the point of view of policy-
-making, the fact that these changes will become apparent only gradually
may be dangerous. As a result, policy-makers may be tempted to postpone
hard policy decisions and essential reforms.
Although the exercise was only a spreadsheet projection omitting many
important links and effects, it still sheds some light on the effects of popu-
lation ageing on public expenditures and raises many questions relevant
for policy-makers. Given the unfavourable demographic trends, policy-ma-
kers will have to contemplate how to address the pressures on public ex-
penditures stemming from population ageing. Although some of the expen-
ditures may attenuate the impact of population ageing on the pension
system and health care spending, they are unlikely to reverse the unfa-
vourable trends of the deteriorating primary deficit and exploding public
debt. However, in addition to population ageing, the path of public debt is
to a large extent determined by the poor starting position of Czech public
finances.
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21 An additional argument for not increasing the participation rate is the fact that in interna-
tional terms the participation rates in the Czech Republic are already fairly high.Three conclusions can be drawn from the projection exercise. Firstly, full
indexation to wages should be avoided, as it leads to a mounting imbalance
between the incomes and outlays of the pension system. Less generous in-
dexation formulae and other parametric changes (especially extension of
the retirement age) could stabilise the system in the next decade and pro-
vide time for implementing pension reform. Secondly, the starting position
of the Czech Republic is very poor, in spite of its low debt level and debt in-
terest payments. Thehigh primary deficit is fostering arapid rise in thedebt
irrespective of population ageing. Aconsolidation strategy aimed at primary
deficit reduction will have to be introduced. Thirdly, the results of the pro-
jection exercise call for a thorough analysis of the systems most affected by
population ageing, namely the pension system and health care system. Pro-
found reforms of the pension and health care systems will have to be drawn
up and introduced, so that the impact of population ageing on public spen-
ding can be withstood.
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The paper explores the long-term fiscal implications of population aging in
the Czech Republic. The results, although bearing a significant margin of uncer-
tainty due to the very long-term character of the projection exercise, do not impart
encouraging fiscal outlooks for the Czech Republic. This is hardly surprising given
that the Czech Republic is facing pronounced population ageing. Moreover, the fis-
cal position of the Czech Republic is presently very poor, in spite of its (still) low le-
vel of debt and debt interest payments. The Czech Republic’s high primary deficit
will foster a rapid rise in debt irrespective of population ageing. Therefore, to cope
with the expected fiscal pressures, it is necessary not only to overhaul the pension
and health-care systems in the medium term, but also to immediately start an in-
tensive strategy of consolidation aimed at significantly reducing the high primary
deficit.
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